More on IP concealment

We are all aware of what IP addresses are. Let’s get to know the different methods for IP concealment and how it works.

                             

                                 Although diff erent users use different technologies, all anonymizers have one thing in common. Whoever wants to surf anonymously needs an anonymous IP. Here, the user can pick between three methods i.e. VPN (Virtual Private Network), Onion Routing and Mix cascades. In the case of VPN, the user must first install a client software, which latches itself on to the system and automatically intercepts all packages sent in the network. Thus, the enquiries first go to a server via an encrypted tunnel and this server forwards the user to the respective website with a new IP. The accessed URL remains invisible for the private provider. Only an anonymous IP is forwarded to the website operator. VPN servers are extremely quick but have a fundamental disadvantage. The client must be able to trust his provider. This is because although the user surfs anonymously outwardly from there on, his complete data is available on the servers of the VPN service. If a hacker ferrets out this server, he gets the IP address of the user and, if available, even the user name and log-in password for the VPN client. Theoretically, even the authorities have it easy here. The Data Retention makes it mandatory for German VPN operators to hoard up the IP addresses. Whether and in which scope they need to release the IPs of the user has not yet been explained conclusively. Just two months ago, the District Court of Bamberg decided that an anonymizer service cannot indiscriminately be forced to give out the data of its clients, it is compelled to do that only in the case of severe criminal offences.                      

                                   The Onion Routing, for instance the Tor network has a completely diff erent approach than that by VPN. Here, the user does not use a fixed server but many free proxy servers. A website enquiry is sent via three Tor servers that are constantly changed and re-encrypted at every station. Identifying a particular user in this network is barely possible. The connection can be monitored if the invader keeps a check on the first and last node. But this does not lead to a complete user profile since the connection changes every ten minutes. Even then, monitoring one session would suffice to obtain sensitive data. 

                                   Mix cascades are also configured like the Onion Routing, for e.g. John Doe where the user connects to a server (Mix) that encrypts the enquiry and forwards it to other servers (mix cascades). But instead of using free nodes here, the operators back specific providers. All users that surf using the same mix cascades are also forwarded over the same route. Thus, it is possible for the server to mix the connection data of all users to additionally complicate the traceability of a person. 

                                  The data retention problem also principally applies to the mix cascades. However, it can be dealt with, if the client can determine the location and the operator of the mix. If he uses three servers from three different providers for instance, tracing back would only be possible with a lot of effort. Moreover, if the mixes are in three different countries, the chances of the data snooper are almost nil.